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ABSTRACT 
 
Many personality theories link specific traits to the sensitivities of the neural systems 
that control approach and avoidance. But there is no consensus on the nature of these 
systems. Here we combine recent advances in economics and neuroscience to provide a 
more solid foundation for a neuroscience of approach/avoidance personality. We 
propose a two-stage integration of valuation (loss/gain) sensitivities with motivational 
(approach/avoidance/conflict) sensitivities. Our key conclusions are: (1) that valuation of 
appetitive and aversive events (e.g. gain and loss as studied by behavioural economists) 
is an independent perceptual input stage – with the economic phenomenon of loss 
aversion resulting from greater negative valuation sensitivity compared to positive 
valuation sensitivity; (2) that valuation of an appetitive stimulus then interacts with a 
contingency of presentation or omission to generate a motivational ‘attractor’ or 
‘repulsor’, respectively (vice versa for an aversive stimulus); (3) the resultant 
behavioural tendencies to approach or avoid have distinct sensitivities to those of the 
valuation systems; (4) while attractors and repulsors can reinforce new responses they 
also, more usually, elicit innate or previously conditioned responses and so the 
perception/valuation-motivation/action complex is best characterised as acting as a 
‘reinforcer’ not a ‘reinforcement’; and (5) approach-avoidance conflict must be viewed 
as activating a third motivation system that is distinct from the basic approach and 
avoidance systems. We provide examples of methods of assessing each of the constructs 
within approach-avoidance theories and of linking these constructs to personality 
measures. We sketch a preliminary five-element reinforcer sensitivity theory (RST-5) as 
a first step in the integration of existing specific approach-avoidance theories into a 
coherent neuroscience of personality.  
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1.1 The Goal 
 
With the upsurge of neuroscience in psychology, there has been a proliferation of 
theories that incorporate personality traits with neural systems that control basic 
approach and avoidance behaviours. In some cases, this is purely in terms of approach 
and avoidance (Gray, 1970); in others, approach and avoidance are part of larger 
schemes (e.g., Cloninger, 1986; Cloninger et al., 1993; for an overview, see DeYoung 
and Gray, 2009). In fact, the number of these theories has increased rapidly, and 
members of this extended family include: Depue (Depue and Collins, 1999; Zald and 
Depue, 2001); Davidson (Davidson et al., 1990; Davidson et al., 2004); and Carver 
(Carver, 2004; Carver, 2008; Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009; Carver et al., 2008; 
Carver and White, 1994). However, as these theories have proliferated, they have tended 
to become separated from the increasingly complex neural bedrock on which they are 
nominally based. We recognise this problem as significant for maintaining consensually 
agreeable definitions of basic concepts, behaviours and underlying systems. In the 
absence of agreement on these basic issues, it is difficult to know whether differences 
between theories are substantive rather than differences of definition and/or emphasis. 
In this article, we summarise key aspects of what is currently known about the basic 
state control of approach and avoidance, and the conflict that can occur between them. 
These are important for theories of personality; and we provide a preliminary translation 
of the knowledge of these state systems into the realm of personality description and 
explanation.  
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1.2 The Problem 
 
Approach-avoidance personality theories invoke long term sensitivities of the 
major state systems that are activated by appetitive and aversive stimuli, and so attempt 
to explain consistent patterns of individual differences in behavior. Current theories are 
not strongly linked to their a priori theoretical and empirical foundations. In particular, 
questionnaires are often constructed intuitively and not validated against more objective 
neural or behavioural criteria. To tackle this major problem, we argue for the necessity to 
build a consensus as to the scientific foundations of all approach-avoidance personality 
theories.  It is these general state systems, their interactions, and how they differ between 
individuals, that provide the facts that are the progenitors of all members of the family of 
approach-avoidance theories.  
 The fundamental problem we address is that, in statistical terms, independent 
trait level variables are the result of interacting state systems. Traits can be viewed as 
constants within psychological input-output equations. But states, and particularly the 
behavioural and other measures we use to assess changes in them, are the result of the 
combination (and often interaction) of the effects of multiple, rapidly changing, variables 
within an individual.  
At the state level, the main problem is theory specification. To test a neuroscientific 
personality theory, one must take into account the details of the state theory ‘equations’ 
through which the trait ‘constant’ expresses its effects. As we will see (Section 2), this 
requires careful definition of state level constructs and of their detailed interaction with 
experimental variables. This issue is complicated by the fact that neural state theories 
continue to evolve and so their mapping to specific trait measures also needs to evolve.  
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1.3 The Solution 
 
One solution to this problem is to provide a neuroscientific groundwork that is 
driven by recent advances in the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) of personality  
(Gray, 1970, 1973, 1981, 1982; Gray and McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton and Corr, 
2004, 2008b), which has a lineage dating back to the origins of the current family of 
approach-avoidance theories of personality. We believe that, while the specifics of each 
member theory of the approach-avoidance family may currently differ, the fundamental 
underlying constructs to which they are intended to apply should not – or, if they do, 
then these differences should be made clear. However, we also believe that the precise 
nature of these constructs, and of the state interactions between them, remains to be 
demonstrated experimentally via hypothesis testing of theories such as the preliminary 
one presented here. 
In this article, we will end with an attempt to produce a theory, a revised RST, to 
indicate possible steps in the direction of integration, so that falsification of it can drive 
future development. But, our main aims are to provide: (1) a clearer definitional picture 
of background state concepts, many of them thought to be well-established, that underlie 
any approach/avoidance-related trait theory; (2) a linkage between these concepts and 
those of behavioural economics; and (3) a clear (and potentially mathematical) picture of 
the generation of output from the states that result from the interaction of traits with 
situational input.  
We see the road to progress as starting with the original behaviourist and neural 
methodologies on which state theory is based and via which it has evolved. We argue 
that, in humans, travel along this road to a coherent theory of personality will be eased 
by including  methods and theory from the study of valuation as revealed by behavioural 
economics and extended into the neuroscience realm by ‘neuroeconomics’ (Glimcher et 
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al., 2005; Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Loewenstein et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2006; 
Zak, 2004). The potential afforded by the union of economics and personality 
psychology has already been highlighted in several publications (Borghans et al., 2008; 
Ferguson et al., 2011; Frey and Stutzer, 2007).  
 The key feature of this approach is that, as has been urged on other grounds, it 
"involves distinguishing affective value from the requirement for action. That is, it is 
important to orthogonalize Go, No Go, punishment, and reward, and also the orientation 
of the action with respect to the cues (to manipulate other aspects of the Pavlovian status 
of the action), along with the factor controlling whether rewards are related to 
punishment (eg, money gain vs money loss) or not (eg, money gain vs electric shocks)" 
(Boureau and Dayan, 2010, p. 16). But, most importantly, we suggest that the terms 
‘reward’ and ‘punishment’, that have been so prominent in this literature, are used 
ambiguously – as in “whether rewards are related to punishment”. This ambiguity results 
from the conflation by these terms of independent valuation and motivation stages of 
processing. We address this issue by providing a preliminary integration of state 
approach/avoidance theory with fundamental principles and concepts from behavioural 
economics, which have hitherto been largely absent from this research field. 
 
2 BASIC ISSUES 
 
2.1 Core elements for approach-avoidance theories 
 
 There are a number of specific issues, which can be treated independently of 
specific personality theories, and of each other, that provide the bedrock on which all 
approach-avoidance theories (state and trait) must build. Some may seem more pertinent 
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to some theories than others – but, in practice, all theories must take into account the 
data and methods of analysis that drive the usage of certain ‘approach/avoidance’ 
concepts. 
The traits of interest to approach-avoidance personality theories have traditionally 
been linked to ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’, which are usually: (a) seen as fundamentally 
involved in learning; and (b) linked to approach and avoidance, respectively (Gray, 
1975). There are two problems here. In relation to their linkage to learning, there is the 
problem that, a ‘reinforcer’ produces characteristic innate responses as well as 
supporting learning and so the capacity for reinforcement is better seen as just one of the 
properties of a reinforcer (Section 2.2). In relation to their linkage to 
approach/avoidance, there is the problem that the words ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ are 
ambiguous in relation to the omission of expected events. Variation in the effects of 
manipulation of a reinforcer on behaviour can depend not only on the different 
valuations of gains and losses (Section 2.3) but also on whether the manipulation is 
presentation or omission and so generates attraction or repulsion (Section 2.4). This 
raises the issue of how perception/valuation sensitivity interacts with motivation/action 
sensitivity to control observed behaviour (Section 2.5). Preliminary evidence for separate 
valuation and motivation sensitivities is presented in Section 2.6 and 2.7.  
A practical complication for the assessment of trait attraction sensitivity and trait 
repulsion sensitivity is that, at the state level, they not only subtract from each other but 
also have different goal-gradients (Miller, 1944) (Section 2.8). A further complication is 
that, in addition to these subtractive effects, the inhibition of approach by (approach-
avoidance) conflict is neurally distinct from pure avoidance (Gray, 1977). Moreover, the 
processing of conflict (Section 2.9), and the resultant ‘behavioural inhibition’, does not 
encompass all cases where, descriptively, behaviour is inhibited (Gray and McNaughton, 
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2000). Critically, then, when using terms, such as ‘reinforcement’ and ‘behavioural 
inhibition’, there needs to be awareness of the various distinct meanings of these terms 
and of their various implications.  
In this article, we distinguish: (a) processing of perceptual inputs (i.e, the valuation 
of reinforcers that precedes the production of both unlearned and learned behaviour); (b) 
the generation of motivated outputs (i.e. the actions that result from attraction and 
repulsion); and (c) distinct effects on motivated output of the conflict between attraction 
and repulsion. These distinctions provide us with five separate potential sources of 
personality sensitivity that may impact on approach and avoidance behaviour. Although 
future work may show that these five sources collapse at the level of personality 
description and causation, we believe that it is prudent to keep them separate so as to 
test, and thereby potentially refute, their possible separable effects. 
The inclusion of valuation from behavioural economics may also sensitize us to 
the issue that, when testing for effects of these 5 systems, we must also be careful to 
balance factors such as ambiguity, uncertainty and risk that behavioural economics has 
demonstrated generate specific aversions, the neural bases of which are already being 
studied (e.g. Rushworth and Behrens, 2008) and which may have trait components 
(Sallet and Rushworth, 2009).  
A major implication of our analysis is that, because of their valuation/motivation 
ambiguity, the terms ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ should only be used with great care and 
then only when their operational application is make very clear; otherwise they are likely 
to add to theoretical and operational confusion. As discussed below, we prefer the more 
descriptive terms ‘attractor’ and ‘repulsor’ for motivating objects (a) to separate them 
from gain/loss valuation, and (b) to denote their motivational-output functions. 
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Despite our new perspective, ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ can be taken to retain 
their usual meaning provided they are concrete events that are presented rather than 
omitted. In this limited case, they can be treated as positive and negative valuations, 
respectively, that also lead to approach and avoidance, respectively. The usual 
theoretical analysis of reinforcement effects holds in this concrete positive case – except 
that it combines two trait sensitivities for each of reward (gain + approach) and 
punishment (loss + avoidance). However, with the omission of expected events, the 
terms are best avoided. ‘Punishment’, here, is particularly contentious. Depending on its 
meaning, it can imply avoidance of danger, approach to safety, or inhibition of a pre-
potent responses allowing cautious approach to danger. These three meanings are 
neurally distinct from each other. 
We believe that this change in nomenclature will result in theoretical clarity and 
that this will more than outweigh the discomfiture of abandoning the familiarity of 
‘reward’ and ‘punishment’. 
 
2.2 Reinforcement versus reinforcer 
 
In this section, we tackle the distinction between reinforcement and reinforcer 
which will come to play a major role in our elaboration of approach, avoidance, and 
conflict systems underlying personality traits. 
Positive and negative reinforcers, as objectively defined concrete stimuli, appear 
relatively straightforward. For the behaviourist, positive reinforcers increase, and 
negative decrease, the frequency of behaviours on which they are contingent – with 
‘negative reinforcement’ involving the increase in frequency of behaviours by removal 
or omission of the negative reinforcer (Mackintosh, 1974; Millenson and Leslie, 1979). 
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These definitions spring from animal learning studies in the laboratory. But, while 
learning theory is the most analytically tractable source of data, it is not the only guide. 
For the ethologist, organisms approach unconditioned ‘positive reinforcers’ and avoid 
unconditioned ‘negative reinforcers’ (Hinde, 1982). It is at this point that ‘reinforcer’ 
becomes a more contentious term. It is usually taken to imply reinforcement, but both 
types of reinforcer – as concrete objects – can elicit distinctive unconditioned patterns of 
approach or avoidance behaviour in the total absence of any conditioning history. Innate 
stimuli can also be used to produce approach-avoidance conflict; and, when they do, 
they show similar neural (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1972) and pharmacological 
(Blanchard et al., 1997) sensitivities to those produced with learned stimuli. For our 
present purposes, therefore, the terms attractor and repulsor seem more appropriate.  
2.3 Perception/Valuation – a contribution from behavioural 
economics 
 
In this section, the case is made for considering valuation as a distinct stage from 
motivation-output. A reinforcer is an external motivationally significant event. One must 
then confront the issue of individual differences in valuation (both specific exchange 
rates and more general loss/gain differences). Valuation can often be ignored in the state 
animal literature since a fixed (at least average) valuation is often taken as a given and 
not explored within the paradigms used. Animals are food deprived, or other 
arrangements made, and in most cases the motivational conditions are then held constant 
and any variation from time to time, or from animal to animal, contributes to residual 
error. However, it is different in the study of personality, particularly in humans, and any 
systematic variation in valuation will obviously affect the observed approach or 
avoidance behaviour. 
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Figure 1. The relationship of external items to their internal value, which controls the strength 
(but not direction) of their effect on behaviour. Individual items (consumable food, dollar gains, 
etc) have a value that depends on their amount and the current level of specific drive for that 
class of item. The amount, therefore, interacts with an individual exchange rate (first grey 
rectangle, represented by varying arrow thicknesses) to generate an internal valuation, which 
can be positive or negative depending on the valence of the item (e.g. dollar gain versus dollar 
loss in the form of removal from an existing store). For the same amount of the same class of 
item, such as dollars (which necessarily matches individual item exchange rate), negative 
valence has a higher exchange rate (note thicker arrow) and so generates a greater internal 
value than positive (second grey rectangle, e.g. loss aversion). Loss aversion is a relative term 
(comparing the effect of loss with that of the same external value of gain) and we take it to 
represent the difference between trait gain sensitivity and trait loss sensitivity, with the latter 
being the greater.   
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This issue of valuation has already been studied, with a particularly convenient 
reinforcer, in behavioural economics and, more recently, neuroeconomics (Glimcher and 
Rustichini, 2004; Loewenstein et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2006; Zak, 2004): money. With 
dollars as the reinforcer, and with the use of a choice paradigm, the external value of a 
loss (in the form of removal of an amount, such as $1 from an existing store) can be 
objectively equated with the value of a gain (in the form of addition of the same $1 
amount to the store). Responding can be matched in the two cases by comparing, for 
example, omission of loss to presentation of gain. This has allowed economists to study 
the internal valuation of losses and gains, the results of which show significant 
differences between gain valuation and loss valuation (Figure 1). 
Of most influence in this field is the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on 
prospect theory – a refined form, ‘cumulative prospect theory’, was proposed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Prospect theory accounts for how people make decisions 
in situations where they have to decide between alternatives that involve risk (i.e. with 
uncertain outcomes, but where the probabilities of different outcomes are known). Such 
studies show that people do not behave according to expected utility theory and their 
decisions deviate from the strict criterion of classical rationality. The importance for 
personality theories of this line of work is in its description of how people evaluate 
potential losses and gains. The main point is that people tend to think in terms of a 
reference point rather than the final outcome (e.g. total wealth), a phenomenon called 
‘framing’ (e.g. do you prefer to gain a £10 discount or to avoid a £10 surcharge). There 
is now work that relates elements of prospect theory to neural structure (Trepel et al., 
2005) – a paradigm example of the attempt by neuroeconomics to integrate psychology, 
economics and neuroscience.  
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 Prospect theory describes two processes: editing and evaluation. In the, first, 
editing phase, possible outcomes are ordered according to some heuristic (people decide 
which outcomes they see as identical and they then set a reference point and consider 
lower outcomes as losses and larger ones as gains). In the, second, evaluation phase, 
people behave as if they can compute a value (or utility) based on potential outcomes 
and their respective probabilities, and they then choose the alternative having the higher 
utility.  
 The main finding of interest to us within prospect theory is that, given the same 
variation in absolute value (e.g. dollars lost or gained), losses have a larger impact than 
gains. That is, people on average, and when faced with risk, have a different sensitivity 
to gain (i.e. outcomes above their reference point) compared to loss (i.e. outcomes below 
their reference point). Studies typically find a loss sensitivity coefficient of 
approximately two-to-one: people accept risks only if the potential gain is at least twice 
as much as the potential loss (e.g. Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). Lower coefficients 
have also been reported but the basic phenomenon is robust (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).  
In passing it is interesting to note an observation made by Charles Darwin (Darwin, 
1965/1872, p. 344), “Everyone feels blame more acutely than praise”.  
 The greater valuation of loss over gain is understandable in evolutionary terms: 
the consequences of not being loss averse would be much worse than those of being gain 
prone. This principle of loss aversion converts within approach-avoidance theories to 
greater negative reinforcer sensitivity relative to positive reinforcer – provided the words 
‘negative reinforcer’ are taken only in the sense of the valence of an objective event, 
independent of whether the contingency with which it is presented produces approach or 
avoidance.  
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 We return later in this article to the methodological value of economic paradigms 
for the testing of approach-avoidance theories; but, for our current purposes, the key 
point to be derived from behavioural economics is that, on average, humans have distinct 
valuation sensitivities and losses are valued more than gains when holding 
approach/avoidance constant (Tom et al., 2007; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Given 
the within-subject use of money to demonstrate these effects, they cannot be due to 
differences in level of motivation, or of subtle differences of the kind that could give 
different results with supposedly ‘matched’ food and shock as reinforcers. 
 
2.4 Motivation-Output – attraction and repulsion, not reward and 
punishment 
 
Conceptually distinct from valuation is motivation-output; motivation is an 
inferred state and is indicated by actual behavioural output. If gain and loss sensitivity 
can differ, with approach or avoidance held constant, it follows that attractor and 
repulsor sensitivity can differ with gain or loss held constant (for evidence see Section 
2.6). That is, attractor sensitivity operates with both gain and omission of loss, while 
repulsor sensitivity operates with both loss and omission of gain. The full implications of 
this distinction are not known for personality traits, and have not previously been 
considered – whether they are less important than implied here must await future 
empirical research. However, as the research evidence presented below indicates, there 
are grounds for assuming that they are sufficiently different to be taken seriously in 
future personality research. 
From this we argue that the critical personality factors previously postulated by 
approach-avoidance theories should be termed ‘attractor sensitivity’ (approach) and 
‘repulsor sensitivity’ (avoidance). On this view, response output systems control 
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approach and avoidance behaviours but these are distinct from stimulus input systems 
that process valuation. We have already argued that the economic concept of loss 
aversion demonstrates systematic differences between gain and loss valuation systems. 
However, approach results from both gain and loss omission, while avoidance results 
from both loss and gain omission. This requires that the simple valuation of gain or loss 
(independent of their contingencies) must operate orthogonally to attraction and 
repulsion. This does not imply that they must be orthogonal in terms of personality 
description and causation, but it points to this possibility. 
This orthogonality means that the commonly used terms ‘reward sensitivity’ and 
‘punishment sensitivity’ are ambiguous because they conflate valuation and action. This 
conflation is seen in the names of some commonly used personality measures, for 
example, the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire 
(SPSRQ, Torrubia et al., 2001). Some personality questionnaires focus on specific 
behaviours as opposed to reward and punishment per se, for example, the Carver and 
White (1994) BIS/BAS Scales, while others focuses more on evaluation in the context of 
reward and punishment: General Reward and Punishment Expectancy Scales (GRAPES, 
Ball and Zuckerman, 1990). In the context of the distinction we wish to emphasize, these 
scales are not interchangeable and have different construct validities, especially in terms 
of their internal factor structures and relations with broad measures of personality (For a 
review of this literature see, Torrubia et al., 2008). Reflecting this confusion, 
experimental results are often not consistent with the supposed relationship between the 
trait and state reward/punishment measures (e.g., Leue and Beauducel, 2008; Matthews 
and Gilliland, 1999; Pickering et al., 1997). Much debate in this literature has centred on 
which set of scales ‘is best’. However, according to the position advanced here, these 
discrepancies may result from differences in the nature of these questionnaires - which 
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do not make a distinction between valuation and motivation aspects of approach-
avoidance behaviour and may each combine these in different ways.  
Thus, as we have seen, the previous analysis of ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ 
sensitivities has focussed almost exclusively on discrete presentations of reinforcers to 
the exclusion of the value of their omission and so has confounded perception/valuation 
with motivation/action. However, omission of a positive reinforcer is negative 
reinforcement (Amsel, 1992; Gray, 1987). It is, then, an open question as to how far 
psychometric measures of ‘reward/punishment’ traits actually relate to trait variation in 
valuation of explicit events and how far to trait variation in the strength of the action 
tendency that they produce. As discussed above, the literature suggests that such 
differences may be important. As we will see in section 2.6, these can be separated 
experimentally but they have generally not been so separated in the past.  
2.5 Combining perception/valuation and motivation/action 
 
 In the two previous sections, we have discussed gain and loss as orthogonal to 
approach and avoidance, with the link between valuation and action being provided by 
contingency. This combination of valuation processes, contingencies and motivation 
processes, and the resultant potential sources of personality sensitivity, is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 2. Actual stimuli (or their memory in the case of omission 
contingencies) are first evaluated in terms of their current exchange rate/drive level; this 
will then activate a central positive and/or negative valuation (Figure 1) that will 
determine, among other things, preference between two similar-valence alternatives. In 
our original discussion of loss aversion, the exchange-rate-based step that initiates 
valuation would have delivered equal $GAIN and $LOSS values. That is, amount 
interacts with exchange rate to generate the neural code for ‘External value’ in Figure 2. 
Corr & McNaughton – page 19 
This source-specific value is thus converted to a general positive or negative valuation, 
which provides the basis for choice between qualitatively different alternatives. Both of 
these general valuations has its own trait sensitivity. “Loss aversion”, here, is the result 
of a greater population average (trait) negative valuation sensitivity relative to positive 
valuation sensitivity with the exchange rate of external money being, necessarily, the 
same in both cases. Conversely, the anhedonia that is a feature of some mental disorders 
(Treadway and Zald, 2011) would be seen as a reduction in trait positive valuation 
sensitivity. 
 
































 Loss exchange rate
Gain exchange rate







Figure 2. The combination of valuation and operant factors that determines response strength 
and direction. Items with a specific external value ($1) that can be gained or lost are represented 
by a particular internal amount that will depend on the exchange rate (or the level of “hunger”) for 
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the item (see Figure 1). In this example all inputs are $1 and so exchange rate is ignored. The 
internal value that drives decisions and the intensity of action also depends on whether the item 
is gained or lost. Economic analysis has shown that the same external value generally has a 
greater effect if it is a loss (Loss exchange rate) than if it is a gain (Gain exchange rate). The 
effect of this internal valuation on behaviour then depends on the consequences of responding. 
Gain production and loss prevention activate approach; loss production and gain prevention 
activate avoidance. Concurrent APPROACH and AVOID tendencies are then integrated to 
determine the direction and strength of responding. A fixed internal value of approach and 
avoidance will have different effects on response strength (Attractor exchange rate;  
Repulsor exchange rate) that depends both on factors of reinforcement sensitivity and on the 
distance from the goal that will be achieved by responding. (Approach and avoidance have 
different goal gradients, see Section 2.8.) 
 
 Once the stimulus (or the memory of the stimulus in the case of omission 
contingencies) has been evaluated the direction of action is determined by the expected 
contingency of the action. An increase in positive value, or reduction in (or omission of 
expected) negative value (e.g. a reduction in chronic pain), leads to approach; and an 
increase in negative value, or reduction in (or omission of expected) positive value, leads 
to avoidance. The translation of this final, multiply adjusted, value into the strength of 
action is dependent on distinct approach and avoidance sensitivities.  
 
2.6 Evidence for motivation as distinct from valuation in humans 
The theoretical analysis we have just provided requires linking to experiment, 
both to provide evidence that a two stage theory is required and to provide a means of 
objectively assessing the postulated sensitivities in which personality theorists are 
interested. To assess attractor and repulsor sensitivity as general personality factors, the 
first requirement is to provide measures that, at the state level, eliminate the individual 
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exchange rates of specific motivational stimuli as well as the more general exchange 
rates that give rise to loss aversion.  
Specific exchange rates result from variations in value due to, for example, 
variation in the current deprivational state of the animal for any particular class of 
appetitive or aversive item. As noted earlier, while these effects can seem difficult to 
match in the rodent paradigms that provide the neural foundations of approach-
avoidance theories, it can be done simply in the more modern environment of 
behavioural economics. Money allows the easy manipulation not only of presentation 
and omission of the same motivationally significant item (such as $1) in opposition to 
each other but also the manipulation of whether the presented event is positive (gain) or 
negative (loss from an existing store). On this basis, the strength of reaction to these 
equated exchange-rate-constant values may be determined. 
 The more general exchange rates affecting attractors and repulsors result from 
the difference in valuation of gain and loss in absolute terms. To assess approach and 
avoidance while controlling for this valuation bias, Hall et al. (2011) administered a two 
phase task. In the first phase, humans started with $0 and could move a mouse to a target 
to gain money but with a 50:50 risk of losing money. Non-responding resulted in no gain 
or loss. The gain and loss values were fixed and known for blocks of trials during which 
response speed was measured and where all possible combinations of gain and loss were 
tested across blocks. The second phase was basically the same except that the same 
participants started with a set number of dollars and then each click prevented the loss of 
money but with a 50:50 risk of preventing the gain of money. (Note that from a ‘rational 
economic’ perspective there is no difference between this second phase and the first. A 
response that produces a gain of $1 and one that prevents the loss of $1 have identical 
consequences on take-home amount and so should be rationally valued equally.) Figure 
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3A shows the variation in speed with changes in attractor and repulsor value averaged 
across these two conditions (i.e. averaging across obtaining a dollar gain and preventing 
a dollar loss – eliminating, statistically the effects of loss aversion, see below). The 
procedure and measures are fundamentally similar to those used to test rats in runways. 
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Figure 3. A. Observed speeds resulting from the combination of a specific dollar value (gain 
averaged with omission of loss – separate values plotted as separate curves) for the production 
of a response with a specific dollar value (loss averaged with the omission of gain – repulsor 
value, X axis) for the inhibition of the response. The probability for gain or loss on any particular 
trial was equal. Open circles indicate the point on each curve at which the net value averages to 
$1. B. The same data represented as point values with the curves resulting from the optimised 
fitted functions based on previous animal behaviour analysis (see text). 
 
 Important points to note about these results are that: (1) a net zero dollar value 
for the making of a response does not result in zero response (i.e. minimal speed); there 
appears to be an intrinsic value to responding even for no dollars and this outweighs the 
small intrinsic response cost that must also exist; (2) a net $1 difference between 
attractor and repulsor values produces speeds that depend on their absolute values rather 
than having a fixed “$1” effect; and (3) the interaction of attractor and repulsor values 
produces a curvilinear relationship (see especially the curve for a net $2 attractor value). 
 The observed curves are what would be expected from previous behavioural 
analysis of the variation in the speed of pigeon responding with variation in value (De 
Villiers, 1977; Killeen, 1994). The following function was derived from this literature 
and fitted to the data (Figure 3B). 
 
speed  = k   (A(a) - R(r))  /  ((A(a) +   R(r) ) …………. Equation 1 
Where  
a = aintrinsic + aextrinsic = total attractor value for measured behaviour  
r = rintrinsic + rextrinsic = total repulsor value for measured behaviour 
k = nominal maximum speed 
A = Attractor sensitivity 
R = Repulsor sensitivity 
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Extrinsic values are those imposed by the experimenter and are known. The two 
intrinsic values (aintrinsic, rintrinsic) and the parameters k, A and R must be calculated by a 
least squares fit to the data. This fit accounted for 98% of the variance in the averaged 
data and individual participant fits accounted for 89% on average of the individual data 
(range 58-96%). The goodness of these fits shows good generalisation of the previous 
animal analysis to this human task. 
The critical result was that attractor sensitivity was always greater than repulsor 
(A:R ranging from 1.7 to 5.4 times the strength), thus the attractor and repulsor systems 
clearly have different sensitivities. It should also be noted that the variation in the ratio 
from 1.7 to 5.4 also suggests that there is variation in individual sensitivities. But, in 
typical animal experiments, approach and avoidance gradients are different (see section 
2.8) and so the relative strength of the observed effects of an attractor and repulsor will 
change depending on distance from a goal – with a cross-over at intermediate distances. 
In this case, it could be that the ultimate goal (receipt of money at the end of the 
experiment) is relatively distant. We should also note that attraction being greater than 
repulsion would not be consistent with repulsion being directly linked to loss (given 
demonstrations of loss aversion) but, of course, any effect of loss per se was averaged 
out before fitting the curves (see below for the assessment of loss:gain independent of 
attraction:repulsion). 
Perhaps the most important point for practical purposes is that, at least with these 
measures, attractor variance can only be assessed in the presence of some repulsor 
variance (or speed immediately goes to asymptote). Although the results are evidence for 
the requirement for a two-stage theory, and for their being differences in attractor and 
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repulsor sensitivity, they do not allow direct measurement of the individual sensitivities. 
We consider the implications of this for personality assessment later in this article. 
2.7 Evidence for valuation as distinct from motivation in humans  
 
While gain/loss sensitivity differences are well established in the economic 
literature, if we are to argue for a two-stage model it is important to demonstrate this 
within the same paradigm as we have demonstrated attractor/repulsor differences. Hall et 
al (2011) also assessed loss aversion, independent of attractor/repulsor differences, by 
calculating the difference between the use of gain and omission of loss to promote 
responding, and the difference between the use of omission of gain and presentation of 
loss to inhibit responding (i.e. the differences between the pairs of curves that were 
averaged to produce Figure 3). This difference (Figure 4) does, indeed, demonstrate loss 
aversion. That is, variations in speed are more extreme when omission of loss is used to 
generate responding than presentation of gain. 
It should be noted here that our problem in resolving absolute attractor and 
repulsor sensitivities recurs with loss aversion. That is, loss aversion is measured relative 
to gain and is, in that sense, simply a ratio.  
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Figure 4. Observed differences in speed between gain and loss manipulations for the 
combination of a specific attraction value for the response with a particular repulsion value. 
Attraction dollar value is gain averaged with omission of loss (separate values plotted as 
separate curves). Repulsion dollar value is loss averaged with the omission of gain and is plotted 
on the X axis. The probability of gain or loss on any particular trial was equal. Open circles 
indicate the point on each curve at which the attraction and repulsion values are equal. 
2.8 Attraction versus repulsion: subtraction, gradients and direction  
 
 We have so far discussed factors for which insufficiently tight definitions, or 
conflation of distinct meanings, will have previously led to difficulties in the testing of 
approach-avoidance theories. In this section, we deal with a number of other known 
parametric issues that will also be important for the generation and testing of quantitative 
predictions. That is, to apply even a simple binary approach/avoidance model to specific 
experiments, one needs to take into account some details of how attraction and repulsion 
operate and interact. A wealth of animal experiments have shown that attractors and 
repulsors of a particular value do not produce fixed behaviour nor, when they are co-
activated, do they produce independent, or linear, effects on approach and avoidance 
tendencies  (Mackintosh, 1974; Millenson and Leslie, 1979).  
 The most obvious interaction of attraction and repulsion is a subtractive effect on 
choice behaviour (see, Boureau and Dayan, 2010). If, when making a choice based on 
attraction, one of the alternatives is also moderately repulsive, the average rat or human 
will decrease their tendency to make that choice. Likewise, addition of attraction will 
reduce the tendency to make a choice that avoids repulsion.  
What is less obvious is that co-activation of attraction and repulsion produces an 
additive effect on arousal. That is, while the probability of making a choice may be 
decreased when the opposing motivation is added, the intensity with which the 
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behaviour is emitted can be increased. The interaction of this increased arousal with 
decreased response probability can give rise to a variety of non-linear changes in 
observed behaviour of which behavioural contrast and peak shift have been subjected to 
the most detailed analysis in terms of the implied interactions between the approach and 
avoidance systems (Gray and Smith, 1969). One experimental consequence is that the 
addition of a mild repulsor can, paradoxically, invigorate ongoing attractor-controlled 
approach behaviour. 
Early experiments analysing the speed of running in a runway also showed that the 
motivational value of attractors and repulsors varied with distance from a goal box – and 
that this goal gradient is steeper for repulsors than attractors  (Gray, 1987; Miller, 1959). 
However, few experiments have been designed in such a way as to allow extraction of 
the relevant gradients or estimation of the subject’s position along them. While the 
analysis of gradients in the animal literature has focussed on spatial distance from a goal, 
such gradients also clearly operate in relation to time in, for example, the acceleration of 
responding during the interval of a fixed interval schedule (Zeiler, 1977) and, within the 
human literature, in delay discounting (Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2010). 
The combination of the subtractive interaction between approach and avoidance 
tendencies, and the difference in their goal gradients, explains the typical behaviour 
when faced with the combination of an attractor and a repulsor as the outcome of action. 
The typical rat in a runway (or human in more complex, including social, situations) will 
initially approach the location at which both positive and negative consequences are 
available. At this initial, long distance, approach tendencies are stronger because their 
gradient is shallower. The closer to the location, the slower will be approach (since the 
strength of the avoidance tendency is increasing faster and is subtracting from approach); 
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until, if the repulsion is sufficiently strong, approach will cease before the location is 
reached and will be replaced by dithering and displacement activities, such as grooming.  
2.9 Evidence for specific goal conflict processing in humans 
 
We need to add goal conflict to the simple approach tendencies, simple avoidance 
tendencies and the symmetrical tendency of moderate levels of one to subtract from the 
other that we have considered so far. When there is significant approach-avoidance goal 
conflict, i.e. when approach and avoidance tendencies are both strong1 and in relatively 
balanced opposition, then a third system is activated (Gray, 1977). This third system 
creates a need for a pure measure of its activation that is not contaminated, as all motor 
behaviour must be in a conflict situation, by interactions between pure approach and 
pure avoidance. 
There is evidence that a specific component of EEG theta rhythm can provide a 
biomarker for goal conflict processing. According to Gray and McNaughton (2000), 
theta rhythm is important for the processing of conflict by the hippocampus and for its 
interaction with goal processing areas (including prefrontal cortex). It follows that, when 
the hippocampus is processing conflict, theta encoded output will pass from it to areas, 
such a prefrontal cortex, and so enhance any ongoing theta rhythms in those areas – and 
possibly entrain them as well (Young and McNaughton, 2009). 
The occurrence of theta in the EEG has already been linked to anxious 
rumination (Andersen et al., 2009) and to goal conflict (Moore et al., 2006), and is 
known to be the EEG frequency band that best separates psychometrically defined low 
and high BIS individuals (Moore et al., 2012). However, cortical theta clearly represents 
                                                 
1
 When reinforcement values are small (failing to produce significant emotional involvement in 
responding) then goal conflict, as indexed by hippocampal lesions, is not engaged Okaichi and Okaichi 
(1994). This explains the lack of clear conflict effects in the Hall et al (2011) experiment.   
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a variety of processes and frontal midline theta, in particular, has the opposite 
pharmacology and personality correlates from those that would be expected of 
hippocampally-related theta (Mitchell et al., 2008). It is important when attempting to 
demonstrate conflict-related theta, then, to rule out effects of arousal, working memory, 
etc., as well as any effects of motivational stimuli linked simply to attraction and 
repulsion. 
There is, however, a straightforward method of detecting activity in the conflict 
system. The requirement is for three experimental conditions: one generally eliciting 
approach; one eliciting avoidance; and one intermediate. Except for changes in value, all 
other aspects of the task should be the same across the conditions. The prediction is that, 
relative to both the net gain and the net loss conditions, the intermediate condition will 
result in increased theta power in areas such as the prefrontal cortex that are engaged in 
the control of the relevant behaviour.  
Experiments of this type have already been conducted. Neo (2008) recruited 
human participants from a student job search pool; they volunteered for casual labour in 
exchange for cash amounts close to the minimum wage and so were likely to be 
motivated by money. EEG was taken while they performed a simple choice task in three 
different conditions. In all conditions there was a 50:50 probability of gaining 10c for 
pressing a left key and there were no monetary consequence for pressing the right key. 
Across the three conditions the other 50:50 alternatives were: losses of 0c (net average 
value +5c); 10c (net average value 0); and 20c (net average value -5c). The level of gain 
was, thus, constant across the conditions; and the level of loss (and the tendency to avoid 
the left key) increased steadily across conditions. However, the level of conflict in terms 
of gain-loss balance was greatest in the intermediate condition.  
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The results of Neo (2008) show that conflict-specific theta (that is greater theta 
power in the net 0c condition compared to the average of the +5c and -5c conditions) 
was observed most at right frontal and left posterior sites for both 4-5 Hz and 6-7 Hz 
theta. Given the results of Hall et al. (2011), it is important to note that all three 
conditions were equally ambiguous, all had equal risk (in terms of the probabilities of 
the outcomes) and loss was greatest with -5c net. The observed effect appears genuinely 
specific to conflict and cannot be attributed to any of the three classical neuroeconomic 
forms of aversion. The largest conflict effect was observed over the left temporal lobe 
(T3, 4-5Hz) and, across participants, the size of this effect was positively correlated with 
avoidance of left clicks (i.e. greater T3 theta predicted increased conflict-specific 
aversion. These results show the feasibility of using theta as a measure of state conflict 
processing, uncontaminated by activity in the approach and avoidance systems. 
 
3 AN UPDATED STATE REINFORCER THEORY 
 
3.1 Reinforcers as a basis for a state theory of approach and 
avoidance 
 
 In the previous section, we discussed issues that we believe must be taken into 
account by any approach-avoidance theory of human personality. These issues are driven 
largely by experimental data and do not, in and of themselves, entail any particular 
theoretical integration. But to proceed to a specific theory of traits, it is important to have 
a coherent theory of the states for which trait factors provide consistent biases. Critically, 
trait factors express their effects on behaviour through state systems and their effects can 
only be properly explained in the context of an explicit state theory. 
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The state theory described in this section is based on that developed by Gray (1975, 
1982) and recently modified and extended by us, and includes a quite detailed neurology 
that will not be discussed here (Gray and McNaughton 2000; McNaughton and Corr 
2004, 2008b). The operation of the basic systems previously described is, here, further 
extended to an explicit two-stage model. We add valuation as a distinct input stage 
linked to a distinct goal-processing output stage and, in addition to the behavioural 
evidence we have discussed, there is neural evidence for distinct valuation and 
motivation mechanisms (e.g., Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012).  
Despite the apparent complexity of its internal constructs and stages, the theory 
retains an unchanging, behaviourist, bedrock. Each aspect of each stage can be tested for 
its effects on behaviour or directly recorded neural activity (see Section 2) and for its 
pharmacological sensitivities. This explicit linking to behaviour and the nervous system 
is important because it provides an unambiguous, non-linguistic, set of measures to 
which all approach-avoidance theories can be linked and tested on an equal basis. That 
said, our insistence on behaviour or neuronal activity as evidence for inferred processes 
goes hand in hand with the view that even the lowly rat is driven by cognitions (e.g. 
goals, see below). Indeed, although superficially a paradox, it can be argued that 
behaviour analysis is the optimal means of assessing changes in the cognitive structures 
(Dickinson, 1980; McNaughton and Corr, 2008a) that underlie approach-avoidance 
behaviours 
The output stage of the model retains the classic approach-avoidance assumption of 
two fundamental classes of discrete, concrete, motivating situation: positive and 
negative. These are innate attractors and repulsors (see Section 2), but it remains the case 
that making a stimulus (especially a secondary reinforcing stimulus) contingent on a 
response baseline and then seeing whether the baseline behaviour increases in frequency, 
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decreases, or does not change, is the simplest way of classifying that stimulus. To reflect 
this change in emphasis, we propose that the modified form of RST that we outline 
below be renamed Reinforcer (rather than Reinforcement) Sensitivity Theory. This 
captures the fact that both innate and acquired motivational stimuli (and the omission of 
expected stimuli) can be categorised into two fundamental classes based on whether they 
are positive or negative reinforcers if they are used in a conditioning paradigm. 
The input stage of the model borrows wholesale from the work of behavioural 
economists on valuation. It proposes separate valuation systems for negative and for 
positive reinforcers – with a consistent trait difference between these generating loss 
aversion. Importantly, it also proposes that valuation is a potential confounding factor in 
the assessment of attraction and repulsion. The proposed input stage does not yet 
explicitly include risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. For the moment, we have treated 
these as simple sources of negative stimulus input, differing from others in the same way 
as do shock and cold. But they may require more complex treatment. 
The core of the theory, then, is a combination of distinct gain and loss valuation 
input systems with approach and avoidance motivation output systems; with valuation 
and motivation orthogonalised by presentation/omission contingencies. We believe the 
existing data require such a structure of any theory of approach and avoidance. 
 
3.2 FFFS and BIS: defensive direction 
 
The key feature of our state RST, in comparison with more basic 
approach/avoidance theories, is that it postulates two (Gray, 1967, 1977; Miller, 1959) 
quite distinct avoidance systems – one for simple active avoidance and one for approach-
avoidance conflict (passive avoidance). It identifies active avoidance with fear and a 
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Fight, Flight, Freeze System (FFFS), and it identifies approach-avoidance conflict with 
anxiety and a Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS), in common with the earlier versions 
of the state theory on which all versions of RST are based (Gray and McNaughton, 
2000). By analogy with the concept of ‘defensive distance’ (which accounts for detailed 
variation in the nature of defensive responses with variation in the perceived level of 
threat and so the neural level of processing), the distinction between the FFFS and BIS 
can be seen as one of ‘defensive direction’ That is, the FFFS controls behaviours that 
have evolved to remove the animal from danger, while the BIS controls behaviours that 
have evolved to allow the animal to (cautiously) approach danger (Gray and 
McNaughton 2000; McNaughton and Corr 2004, 2008b). 
 The concept of defensive direction provides a single organising principle to 
define inputs to the BIS, whereas in 1982 Gray provided an ad hoc list. Importantly, it 
treats innate and acquired reactions equally (Blanchard et al., 2011) and the BIS, so 
defined, is generally sensitive to the anxiolytic drugs that provide the gold standard for 
the theory (Gray and McNaughton 2000, Appendix 1). The FFFS, by contrast, is 
relatively insensitive to anxiolytic drugs (or doses) but is sensitive to panicolytic ones 
(Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990a; Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990b; Blanchard et al., 
1997). While predominantly studied in experiments with innate fear, the FFFS must be 
taken to control avoidance of all aversive stimuli, including learned ones. 
 The pharmacological distinction between the FFFS and BIS is particularly 
important when we wish to link this fundamentally rodent-derived theory with past and 
present work on human disorders and the personality types that are risk factors for them 
(Andrews et al., 1990; Duggan et al., 1995; Rovner and Casten, 2001; Roy, 1999). What 
are generally referred to clinically as ‘anxiety disorders’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) include what are, in ethological terms, both disorders of fear (e.g. 
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panic, simple phobia) and disorders of anxiety (e.g. agoraphobia, social anxiety) (Sylvers 
et al., 2011).  It is important support for the theory that the specific anxiolytic drugs that 
define the BIS are effective in (ethologically defined) anxiety disorders but not fear 
disorders, whereas the panicolytic drugs that affect fear directly in rodent ethological 
tests are generally effective with fear disorders. A simple test of any paradigm intended 
for use in assessing BIS sensitivity, then, is whether it is similarly affected by not only 
classical (e.g. benzodiazepine) but also novel (e.g. buspirone) anxiolytics – since these 
two classes of drug do not affect fear, and share no side effects (McNaughton, 2002). 
Equally importantly, our capacity to define the BIS in terms of specific drug receptors 
argues for endogenous ligands (Carboni et al., 1996; Kapczinski et al., 1994; Montagna 
et al., 1995; Polc, 1995), variation in which can provide a substrate for the postulated 
variations in trait sensitivity (Abadie et al., 1999; Hode et al., 2000; Lehmann et al., 
2002). Previous research has pointed to the need to differentiate fear and anxiety in 
personality questionnaires (McNaughton and Corr, 2004; Smillie et al., 2006b) and this 
call has been extended to clinical conditions (Bijttebier et al., 2009). 
According to McNaughton and Corr (2004), the current value of defensive 
distance determines the key locus of control within the FFFS, but is not determined 
solely by the nominal value of perceived environmental threat. If there is concurrent 
conflict between goals (e.g. between approach to and avoidance of the same place) then 
the BIS is activated. An important feature of this activation is that, in addition to a 
tendency to inhibit both ongoing avoidance and ongoing approach and to replace these 
with risk assessment, the BIS increases negative cognitive bias; that is, it increases 
attention to negative stimuli and also amplifies the existing avoidance tendencies 
operating on the FFFS (and thence BIS), essentially decreasing the current defensive 
distance. 
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 In the simplest case, BIS activation merely renders the animal risk averse – 
causing it to choose the less dangerous of two alternatives; to choose to leave the current 
situation if it can; or to remain in safety until the risk has diminished. However, it can 
also generate risk assessment or exploration (behavioural outputs of the BIS), or internal 
memory scanning. If these determine that threat is no longer present then activation of 
the BIS is terminated and behavioural control may revert back to BAS-mediated 
approach or, if threat is confirmed, FFFS-mediated avoidance behaviour. 
 As already noted above, it is important to remember that, in simple English, 
‘behavioural inhibition’, if this means a reduction in behaviour, is not necessarily 
dependent on the BIS. This may seem paradoxical. When attraction and repulsion are not 
approximately equal in value, they subtract symmetrically (Gray and Smith, 1969). 
Repulsion can then reduce responding to attraction and this reduction is not sensitive to 
anxiolytic drugs (McNaughton and Gray, 1983). Thus, in our updated RST, the BIS is a 
system that not only amplifies attention and arousal (as previously postulated by Gray) 
but also amplifies the existing inhibition of behaviour. This amplification, in contrast to 
any background inhibition, only occurs under conditions of goal conflict. Behavioural 
inhibition pure and simple can also occur in the absence of the BIS when the level of 
conflict is low as a result of low levels of motivation (Okaichi and Okaichi, 1994) as 
noted, but only in passing, by Gray and McNaughton (2000).  
 
3.3 The BAS, wanting, and liking 
  
 Our treatment of the BAS, as a system that processes attractors, also requires 
careful distinction between highly motivated behaviour and more simple action. 
Analysis of the systems (each represented at the level of the cortex, striatum, pallidum, 
Corr & McNaughton – page 36 
subthalamus, nigra, and thalamus) that control the production of motor behaviour 
delineates a set of hierarchical systems that control, in parallel, the selection of motor 
acts, actions and goals, respectively (Haber and Calzavara, 2009; Haegelen et al., 2009), 
with a key feature of the control of goals being that it is model-based (Boureau and 
Dayan, 2010). Both at the cognitive level, and in terms of the limbic structures involved, 
the BAS, as a global approach system, is best seen as operating with goals as opposed to 
acts or actions (for a matching model of parallel act, action and goal inhibition systems, 
see Neo et al., 2011).  
 An important point, here, that follows from the analysis we provided in Section 
2.8 is that, while the initial stages of simple avoidance learning will involve avoidance of 
the negative goal of danger, when an avoidance response becomes well learned it will 
involve active approach to the positive goal of safety. So, while initially the FFFS will 
be involved, later control will shift to the BAS. Act and action generation, therefore, 
involves the BAS first identifying an attractor (defined by the combination of value and 
contingency) as a positive goal and then the cortico-striatal-nigral-thalamic system 
selecting actions that lead to the goal in part by concurrently inhibiting alternative 
actions via a mechanism that is independent of the inhibition of goals. 
 Our two-stage view of the BAS requires a distinct valuation stage as input to it. 
Consistent with this view, areas associated with goal processing, such as the 
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum, have been reported to code stimulus value 
(Kang et al., 2011). Neurones in the amygdala do this too (Jenison et al., 2011) – linking 
the somewhat cold sounding concept of ‘value’ to emotional response.  
 We have also accepted the behavioural economic distinction between gain and 
loss that gives rise to loss aversion and there are data that suggest that the amygdala can 
control gain independently of loss (Weller et al., 2007). Conversely, amygdala 
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involvement, in contrast to the ventral striatum, appears to be lost when outcomes do not 
immediately follow responses (Tom et al., 2007). While the magnitude of the ventral 
striatal response differentiates between reward in the form of money and reward in the 
form of cognitive feedback, nonetheless, the same circuits appear to be involved in both 
cases (Daniel and Pollmann, 2010; Kang et al., 2011). All these data are consistent with 
there being two distinct systems that convert environmental inputs to internal common 
currencies of gain and loss, respectively. 
 A strong case has been made (Schultz, 2006, p. 87) that variations in the level 
of response of these neural systems can be linked to “basic theoretical terms of reward 
and uncertainty, such as contiguity, contingency, prediction error, magnitude, 
probability, expected value and variance”. These terms are current in behavioural and 
economic theory. Many of these items relate to variation in the estimation of value or are 
examples of complex aversive reinforcers and have not yet been included in the theory 
presented here. For this reason, it was an important design feature of the experiment 
described in section 2.9 that it held ambiguity, uncertainty and risk constant while 
varying only value; and so eliminated their influences as potential confounds. The 
existing literature already contains a considerable quantity of information that will help 
us to determine suitable anchors for the separate aspects of gain valuation and approach 
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008) that 
we theorise underpin personality factors.  
 However, experiments of the type we have already discussed in section 2.6 and 
2.9 that explicitly separate valuation from motivation, and which exclude changes in 
ambiguity, uncertainty and risk, appear to be largely lacking – but, when carried out, 
show that approach and withdrawal have effects independent of affective valence 
(Thibodeau, 2010). Conversely, activity in the amygdala has been linked, in particular, 
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to the framing effect that generates loss aversion (De Martino et al., 2006) producing 
equivalent effects whether the behavioural result is approach or avoidance. 
 In addition to distinguishing valuation and motivation phases that lead to 
action, we also need to note that “reward contains distinguishable psychological or 
functional components – ‘liking’ (pleasure/palatability) and ‘wanting’ (appetite/incentive 
motivation)” (Berridge, 1996). ‘Liking’ in this sense is probably distinguishable from 
valuation. “Hedonic ‘liking’ by itself is simply a triggered affective state – there is no 
object of desire or incentive target, and no motivation for reward” (Berridge, 2004, p. 
190). Liking, in this sense, has its own neural circuitry (Berridge, 1996, 2004). Wanting, 
by contrast, can be seen as containing all the action-generating components of ‘reward’ 
without accompanying sensory pleasure. This is particularly obvious in many cases of 
compulsive drug-taking by addicts (Berridge, 2004); and in this context it is worth 
noting that hedonic eating and drug taking involve similar neural circuits and response 
patterns (Kenny, 2011). However, particularly in relation to hedonic eating, ‘wanting’ 
and ‘needing’ are thought to be distinct (Finlayson et al., 2007) and so ‘wanting’ may 
not capture all of the action-generating aspects of what one normally terms ‘reward’. 
 Wanting, if this analysis is correct, should contain both valuation and 
motivation components in the sense that we have been using these terms. Valuation here 
is not synonymous with pleasure (conscious or unconscious) but rather reflects the first 
stage of a two-stage process that, via contingency, results in action which may then end 
with pleasure. However, in the same way as it has been difficult to separate liking from 
wanting with the normal paradigms in which ‘rewards’ are delivered, it is difficult to 
separate valuation from motivation. Experimenters seldom compare the effects of 
matched positive and negative reinforcers in factorial combination with their 
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presentation and their removal (as opposed to omission). Separating out these different 
processes would seem a good target for future research. 
 
4 A TRAIT REINFORCER SENSITIVITY THEORY  
 
In section 2, we discussed issues that, we contend, any approach-avoidance theory of 
personality should take into account. In this section, we apply these issues in the 
construction of a theory that incorporates positive evaluation, negative evaluation, 
attraction, repulsion and conflict. Although some degree of testing of such a personality 
theory can be carried out without a detailed state theory, rigorous quantitative testing 
depends on the precise way in which the various input-output relations of the different 
components of the systems interact. That is, it must depend on a detailed state theory that 
delineates the nature of the state interactions that can affect the output used to test for 
trait constants.  
 
4.1 From state theory to trait theory 
  
We endorse the view that such state theories should be neurally anchored. But, 
beyond this trite statement, what are the implications for personality theory of, for 
example, the detailed neural architecture proposed (McNaughton and Corr, 2004) for 
state control systems? Well, this neurology is intended to account for complex 
behaviour, the details of psychiatric disorder, and variation in the specific detailed 
effects of different drugs. But this detail focuses on moment-to-moment behaviour, and, 
in turn, these short-term variations are controlled by changes in more global external 
factors, such as the level of threat in the current environment. The major question is: 
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How should this state representation translate to the trait level? Below, we offer an 
answer to this question, but it is only one of a number of possible answers. Putting aside 
the specific correctness of the details of our proposed theory, we believe that the general 
form it takes has important implications for any such attempt to translate state systems to 
trait processes and measurements.   
To illustrate one specific example, in the case of the FFFS, with escape and 
active avoidance, the concept of ‘defensive distance’ translates into the level of fear 
experienced: the closer the aversive stimulus, the greater the state of fear (e.g. the fear of 
death is not so terrifying when it is at some unknown time in the future; if it were 
tomorrow then fear would be greater). But, in addition to actual distance, and 
importantly in the case of clinical illness, level of fear is determined by sensitivity to the 
stimuli involved, that is, to fearfulness: some people show high levels of fear at a 
distance which for most people evoke, if at all, mild fearfulness (e.g. with air travel). 
Crucial here is the fact that level of fear experienced reflects the particular defensive 
behaviour shown. For example, each rat shows specific behaviours at its own particular 
actual distances from a particular predator – but with the different defensive behaviours 
appearing in the same sequence for all rats. It is the stability of this sequence that 
provided the original justification for the Blanchard’s original concept of ‘defensive 
distance’. So, too, in humans, a similar sequence is observed: mild threat elicits 
avoidance and flight, higher threat freezing, and intense and immediate threat panic and 
fight. 
But these individual differences in fearfulness cannot be specific to a particular 
neural level of the FFFS: it is fundamental to the concept of defensive distance that 
fearfulness is a multiplier that controls which level of the system is selected by any 
particular standardised external intensity of threat. A highly fearful person, or rat, will 
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perceive a greater threat and thus activate a different module in the defence hierarchy (so 
they might panic when a less fearful person would actively avoid).  
Likewise, anxiolytic drugs have been shown to affect defensive distance rather 
than to have a consistent effect on specific defensive behaviours. For example, in the 
rodent, rearing occurs at intermediate defensive distances. A reduction from a high level 
of threat to intermediate threat produces rearing, while further reduction in threat 
eliminates rearing and replaces it with normal daily behaviour. Administering an 
anxiolytic drug acts as if it is reducing threat rather than consistently increasing or 
consistently decreasing rearing behaviour as such. When rearing is low because of high 
threat, the drug increases rearing; but when rearing is high because of intermediate 
threat, the drug decreases rearing (Blanchard et al., 1991; McNaughton, 1985; 
McNaughton et al., 1984).  
We have focussed here on the defense system because it has been analysed in 
detail, but Gray and McNaughton (2000) were quite explicit that positive goal-directed 
action was as hierarchically organised within the BAS as was negative within the 
defense system (see their Figure 9.4). However, for the same reasons as with our 
considerations of the defense system, we believe that the hierarchical levels of these 
systems can largely be ignored when considering trait approach sensitivity. 
The factors that personality researchers should be most interested in, we believe, 
must act at least as generally as does an anxiolytic drug. They must normally control 
broad classes of behaviour – they should not be specific to behaviours within a class. 
However, this position leaves open the possibility that there may exist additional more 
specific personality factors related to the sensitivity/activity of more specific modules of 
the hierarchy (e.g. panic and obsession), and these sensitivities may be especially 
relevant to specific clinical conditions. 
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In principle, then, one might be concerned only with approach, avoidance and 
approach-avoidance conflict; but a major change of emphasis in our new reinforcer 
sensitivity theory adds to these gain and loss (i.e. general factors controlling the 
detection and valuation of environmental stimuli). Gain and loss (coupled with 
appropriate contingencies) serve as inputs to attraction and repulsion systems (the BAS 
and FFFS, respectively). Thus, there is a cascade of effects from gain/loss valuation, 
interacting with contingency, to attraction/repulsion. Within this framework, repulsion 
and attraction are probably at the heart of what were previously called ‘punishment’ and 
‘reward’ sensitivities – but where valuation was not considered a separate stage. As 
discussed above, at present these processes seem conflated in the different psychometric 
measures of reward/approach and punishment/avoidance. We contend that this addition 
of loss and gain valuation (input) systems to BAS, FFFS and BIS (output) disentangles 
the previously problematic categories of ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’. The cost of cutting 
this Gordian Knot is an increased level of theoretical complexity but, it is to be hoped, it 
will be repaid by increased conceptual clarity and experimental precision; and certainly 
each element can, as we have seen above, be tested independently of the others. 
 
4.2 The trait theory 
  
 Our proposed trait theory derives directly from the state theory described above 
by ascribing specific long term, trait, sensitivities to the operation of specific links in the 
state systems. These links are indicated in Figure 5 by stippled shading.    
 As summarised in Figure 5, the BAS and FFFS are primary affective systems 
responsible for approach and avoidance, respectively. They will be activated in isolation 
when an attractor (e.g. PosR+, NegR-; i.e. explicit positive reinforcer presentation, 
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explicit negative reinforcer omission) needs only to be approached, and a repulsor (e.g. 
NegR+, PosR-,) needs only to be avoided, respectively. In addition to the variations in 
motivational level and other factors that affect the value of specific reinforcers, the 
model includes general PosR/NegR sensitivity differences to accommodate the loss 
aversion (i.e. NegR>PosR) demonstrated by behavioural economics (Tversky and 
































































Figure 5. Overall relation of the BIS, FFFS and BAS – an updated model. To activate the BIS 
one must generate concurrent and approximately equal activation of the FFFS and the BAS, i.e. 
face the animal with an approach-avoidance conflict. Both simple approach and simple 
avoidance will then be inhibited and replaced with environmental scanning (in the form of altered 
attention), external scanning (risk assessment behaviour) and internal scanning of memory. Note 
that all of these scanning operations are aimed at detecting affectively negative information and 
involve a selective increase (stippled arrow) in the salience and value of aversive information. As 
a result, a secondary consequence of activation of the system is normally a shift of the balance 
between approach and avoidance tendencies in the direction of avoidance. However, when 
scanning determines that danger is absent the approach-avoidance conflict is resolved in favour 
of approach. The inputs to the system are classified in terms of the delivery (+) or omission (-) of 
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primary positive reinforcers (PosR) or primary negative reinforcers (NegR) or conditional stimuli 
(CS) or innate stimuli (IS) that predict such primary events. (Adapted from Gray and 
McNaughton, 2000.) As discussed earlier we see loss (i.e. removal of a positive reinforcer from 
an existing store) as a form of NegR, thus allowing for both Loss+ and Loss- (see section 2.6, 
2.7). Specific cases of PosR and NegR will have their own individual exchange rates but, as 
discussed in the text, their effect will also be modulated by a general sensitivity factor that is 
different for the two classes of reinforcer. The stippled areas in the model are all points at which 
general personality factors could operate (see section 4). 
 
 
----- Figure 5 about here ----- 
 
There are two features of this scheme that make testing via economic 
experiments particularly attractive. First, is that PosR+ and PosR- operate on the BAS 
and FFFS, respectively, so manipulation of just one specific reinforcer (PosR, in dollars, 
say) should be able to assess the relative sensitivity of the BAS and FFFS since the 
absolute value of PosR+ and PosR- can be made equal and, except for the change in 
direction, their exchange rates must be equal also. Second is that NegR can involve 
explicit loss from an existing store and so this expected loss can itself be experimentally 
omitted, generating NegR-. It follows that, if one compares addition of dollars to a store 
with removal of dollars from the store, one can compare PosR and NegR with the 
assurance that the specific exchange rate (including variation in drive) is matched.  
It is possible, then, to assess the value of loss relative to gain and the value of an 
attractor (approach) relative to a repulsor (avoidance) using money. With a store of 
dollars, gain (addition of dollars), omission of expected gain, loss (removal of dollars), 
and omission of expected loss are all valued in the same currency. This allows the 
differences between PosR and NegR (whether presented or omitted) and of attraction 
and repulsion (averaged over gain and loss) can be assessed on an equal footing – as 
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demonstrated in section 2.6. It is possible to make similar arrangements with rats (e.g. 
with food being stolen from a store) but technically much more difficult to arrange clear 
parity between PosR and NegR. 
In terms of general approach-avoidance behaviour, 5 separate basic sensitivities 
need to be considered: positive valuation and negative valuation (on the input side), and 
approach, avoidance and conflict (on the output side): ‘motivation’ is the inferred central 
state linking these two sets of processes. Assuming that these processes are independent 
at the trait level, our state tests must take into account (or counterbalance out) their likely 
interactions (e.g. where a variation in sensitivity to gain can result in increased approach, 
independent of approach sensitivity, per se). 
To deal with this number of sensitivities, and the likely interactions between 
them, it is necessary to use a combination of neural measures with carefully selected, 
non-linguistic, behavioural paradigms. Both the measures and paradigms need to be 
driven by theory with strong a priori hypotheses; and this is why a specific trait theory is 
needed and specified below, as a starting point for experimental attack and refutation. In 
this context, neural measures have an advantage in that they can tap directly into each of 
the specific biological components that are the substrate of a theory with the minimum 
number of assumptions. Certainly, neural-behavioural relations uncovered to test one 
theory are immediately applicable to other theories. Given Smillie’s (2008) extensive 
discussion of neuroscience paradigms, detailed discussion is not needed here.  
In relation to research approaches in human participants, several key points are 
worthy of note: 1) neural imaging and EEG measures can selectively assess internal 
reactions specific to a reinforcer or class of reinforcers and, critically, can isolate stages 
of processing that are conflated in behavioural output (examples have already been 
given, above); 2) drugs can be used to target the key modulatory systems and so 
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challenge the involvement of particular neural or behavioural measures; and, especially 
when one wants to link states to traits (e.g., Perkins et al., 2009)  – on this view, drugs 
may be mimicking endogenous compounds that supply the proximal basis for some 
traits, while genes can be viewed as a relatively fixed source of this intrinsic 
neurochemical variation; 3) molecular genetics can identify at least some aspects of 
some trait components of the state systems (e.g., Perkins et al., 2011).   
Technology now allows for sophisticated designs that combine neural measures 
(e.g. fMRI and EEG), molecular genetics (e.g. candidate genes, or increasingly genome-
wide scans) and psychometric measures of personality traits with carefully selected 
stimuli, of the type discussed above, to activate selective parts of the defensive and 
approach systems. A general theory, of the type presented here, would facilitate this 
research work. 
   
4.3 Higher order factors: Neuroticism/worry 
 
 To identify specific trait sensitivities for each of a set of distinct neural 
approach-avoidance systems does not rule out the possibility that higher-order factors 
may mediate changes in more than one of the systems we have defined. In particular, our 
analysis calls for separate defensive trait sensitivities for FFFS-related fear/active 
avoidance (with avoidant personality disorder potentially representing an extreme) and 
BIS-related anxiety/passive avoidance/conflict (with generalised anxiety disorder 
representing an extreme). However, the two underlying neural systems are equally 
innervated by monoamine systems (serotonin and noradrenaline) and, if one sees drug 
treatment of psychiatric disorder as operating through something akin to a change in 
personality, one must note that the more general serotonergic drugs (i.e. drugs that are 
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not specific to 5HT1A receptors) treat fear and anxiety disorders equally well (not to 
mention also treating depression). In addition to specific active avoidance and conflict 
factors, then, there appears to be a higher order serotonergic/noradrenergic factor. 
If we look among current scales for a possible example of such a superordinate 
factor, Eysenck’s Neuroticism immediately obtrudes itself. Importantly, it appears to be 
an indiscriminate risk factor for the development of both fear and anxiety disorders (as 
well as depression) (Andrews et al., 1990). A risk factor for a set of things cannot be any 
one of those things itself and so a simple explanation of the findings is that neuroticism 
is a factor that, in the long term, or interacting with extreme events, can result in 
increases in trait anxiety and/or trait fear and/or trait depression (with extremes of each 
of these constituting disorder). Indeed, as we have argued in relation to the role of 
dopamine, the serotonergic factor may relate more to the modifiability of trait fear and 
trait anxiety than directly influencing their values. This suggestion is consistent with the 
apparent partial relationship between Eysenck’s Neuroticism and Trait Anxiety 
(Spielberger et al., 1983), provided we presume that the latter is more closely measuring 
trait anxiety as we have defined it in our theory.  
Following on from this view of neuroticism, it is worth taking a close look at one 
of its components: worry. The psychological state corresponding to what in the 
neuropsychological (but not economic) literature would be called risk assessment 
(including memory scanning) can perhaps be viewed by some as worry – if by this we 
mean simply the immediate perception of approach-avoidance conflict. However, if by 
‘worry’ one means iterative rumination, this has not been studied in rats and was not 
explicitly dealt with even by the most recent detailed exposition of state RST (Gray and 
McNaughton, 2000). Critically, such ruminative worry appears to depend on a factor that 
is independent of anxiety in the most basic sense of the term (Meyer et al., 1990). 
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Further, worriers in the sense of those with a tendency to iterative rumination seem 
characterised by a general failure to control negative cognitive intrusions whether these 
relate to simple avoidance or to conflict (Borkovec et al., 1983). A tendency to worry is, 
therefore, a risk factor for anxiety disorders because such negative rumination can result 
in a failure to resolve the underlying conflict (e.g. by worry itself producing further 
conflict). This failure of ruminative control is also typical of disorders of simple 
avoidance, such as obsessive compulsive disorder, that are insensitive to the anxiolytic 
drugs that define the BIS but are sensitive to frontal cortical lesions (Powell, 1979). 
More work needs to be directed at clarifying the relationship between the FFFS/BIS and 
Neuroticism, as well as the role played by worry. Here, genetic approaches may be 
especially useful in delineating their structural properties, and neural and behavioural 
measures their process relationships. 
 
4.4 Higher order factors: Extraversion 
 
 Previous work has superficially linked dopamine with ‘reward’ and 
extraversion. But, as we noted earlier, ‘reward’ in this literature conflates gain with 
approach and dopamine release is not reward-related as such. Extraversion is, therefore, 
likely to be a superfactor of the same type as neuroticism. 
 As well as distinguishing gain and approach we have also already made a 
distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’. Extraversion has two separable but correlated 
subfactors that emerge from factor analysis of many Extraversion facets (DeYoung et al., 
2007). DeYoung (2010) has hypothesized that the two major subfactors within 
Extraversion may reflect the distinction between sensitivity of the BAS and sensitivity of 
a ‘pleasure system’ (PS). Likewise, the most popular supposed psychometric measure of 
Corr & McNaughton – page 49 
the BAS in personality studies, the Carver & White (1994) scale, has three separate sub-
scales: Drive, Reward Responsivity, and Fun Seeking. Whereas Drive and Reward 
Responsivity both appear to characterize sensitivity to reward primarily, Fun Seeking 
appears to be equally related to impulsivity, and thus may not be as pure an indicator of 
BAS sensitivity (Smillie et al., 2006a; Wacker et al., 2012).  
 In sum, while variation in the dopamine system is clearly an important factor 
that must be taken into account by RST, the dopamine signal does not appear to equate 
with either gain or approach as such. If it is linked to extraversion, then, this may be a 
superordinate factor related to the modification of responding rather than representing 
either trait gain or trait approach. This would match the role we have attributed to the 
other monoamines and neuroticism in the previous section. This suggestion would be 
consistent with one of the several subfactors of extraversion or “BAS” scales being a 
specific measure of the BAS as defined here, while others could relate to gain or to 
pleasure. 
4.5 Lower order factors  
 
While we have argued, above, that personality theorists can deal with approach 
and avoidance systems with a ‘lumping’ strategy at the neural level, we need to add at 
least one caveat. There is reason to believe that there are at least two subordinate trait 
defense factors: obsessionality, likely linked to a subset of serotonergic receptor systems 
limited to areas like the cingulate cortex; and panic, likely linked to variations in the 
CCK system (Wang et al., 1998) and to local changes in the periaqueductal gray (Graeff, 
1991). These are easily derived from the current state theory as trait variation within 
already-defined (McNaughton and Corr, 2004) specific modules of the avoidance system 
but should clearly be seen as additional to RST as it is conventionally framed. 
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4.6 Neuroscience Anchoring of Traits to State Systems 
 
Having proposed the broad outlines of a trait theory, and after noting that much 
more experimental work is needed to test and develop this theory, the next question 
concerns the ‘anchoring problem’ that attends any attempt to relate trait models to state 
systems. This is an important matter for testing the proposals we have made above. 
Factors recovered from questionnaires may reflect semantic rather than 
biological regularities and this is particularly the case if the items included in a 
questionnaire are chosen for their semantic content (e.g. asking people about presumed 
approach or avoidance behaviour) rather than for their links to presumed biological 
states (e.g. the sleep and weight items in the Beck Depression Inventory). Thus, causal 
theories of personality face a fundamental problem in identifying biological (and 
cognitive) systems that underlie personality factors. Most importantly, the use of factor 
analysis creates a problem in that it does not anchor the extracted factors within the 
multidimensional space that it derives (Block, 1995; Corr and McNaughton, 2008; 
Lykken, 1971). Therefore, factor analysis can provide only a preliminary guide to the 
biological processes underlying the most common trait variations in a population.  
Given a) behavioural paradigms that can activate each of the differently valenced 
components of the different stages of processing, and b) concurrent EEG and/or fMRI 
measures, which allow stages of processing to be separated on the basis of both latency 
and neural location, we should be able to identify separate values for gain, loss, 
attraction and repulsion – and so anchor them (Gray et al., 2005; Reuter, 2008). fMRI is 
already being used to assess valuation (Trepel et al., 2005); and extreme cases of 
anhedonia may also be helpful here (for a review of anhedonia and depression, see 
Treadway and Zald, 2011). A good example of this form of approach is provided by 
Cunningham et al. (2010), who reported the association of fMRI-defined amygdala 
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reactions with two major facets of Neuroticism taken from the Five-Factor Model: 
Volatility and Withdrawal, which have previously been related to the FFFS and BIS, 
respectively (DeYoung et al., 2007). In the Cunningham et al. (2010) study, participants 
were presented with positive, negative, and neutral images and were required to 
approach (move perceptually closer to) or avoid (move perceptually farther away from) 
stimuli in different blocks of trials – this relates to the defensive direction hypothesis of 
RST (McNaughton and Corr, 2004). Results showed that higher scores on Volatility 
increased amygdala activation to negative stimuli (regardless of whether they were 
approached or avoided), while higher scores on Withdrawal increased amygdala 
activation to all approached stimuli (regardless of stimulus valence). A similar approach 
could be pursued to separate valuation from motivational outputs. 
 Once pure avoidance (FFFS-related) and pure approach (BAS-related) 
sensitivities have been estimated then their conflict may be measured by the EEG theta 
rhythm. The capacity to change theta rhythm is diagnostic of anxiolytic action, with at 
present no false positive and no false negatives (McNaughton et al., 2007). 
Neuropsychological theory (Gray and McNaughton, 2000) predicts that theta-encoded 
output from the hippocampus will invade other structures only when the hippocampus is 
producing functional output. The expected resultant behaviour-dependent phase-locking 
of theta rhythm between the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex has been demonstrated 
in rats (Young and McNaughton, 2009). Conflict-specific increases in frontal (or other 
cortical) theta power in the human EEG can, therefore, potentially, provide a pure 
measure of BIS activation (e.g. Andersen et al., 2009), and this rhythm has been shown 
to differentiate psychometrically-defined low and high BIS individuals (Moore et al, 
2012). 
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However, some care is required here. Results such as those reported by Andersen et 
al. (2009), showing enhanced theta coherence during experimentally-induced anxious 
rumination, may provide support for the theory. But they do not meet the strict criterion 
of examining behaviourally-defined conflict in a situation where the influences of 
attraction and repulsion can be excluded. Previous research has not controlled for simple 
approach and avoidance before testing the effects of their conflict. This problem was 
addressed by Neo (2008, see section 2.12) who assessed theta-related conflict at different 
combined levels of attraction and repulsion and, critically, found no difference between 
the approach and avoidance conditions (in contrast to a difference between the average 
of these two and the intermediate conflict condition).  In a similar way to the extraction 
of gain, loss, attraction and repulsion with EEG or fMRI, trait conflict could be extracted 
using theta as a state anchor for trait items in questionnaires or other measures.  
This brief discussion highlights the necessity of theoretically-driven experimental 
designs to isolate specific components of valuation (input) and motivational (output) 
systems. To date, this has not been achieved, arguably because the theory on which such 
studies have been based has been insufficiently precise.  
 
4.7 Anchoring trait measures – the value of drugs 
         
In addition to the paradigmatic manipulations described for the generation of 
conflict-specific theta, we believe it will be important also to validate any state conflict 
measure such as theta with drugs before proceeding to use it as an anchor for 
questionnaire or other items already known to be linked to trait factors. 
 The key neurobiological aspect of the BIS theory is its derivation from the 
effects of anxiolytic drugs, which were only subsequently linked to hippocampal theta 
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rhythm and to conflict. Drugs are always messy instruments and, in relation to the BIS, 
the key requirement is to demonstrate common effects of both classical (e.g. 
benzodiazepine) and novel (serotonergic, e.g. buspirone or SSRIs) drugs. These distinct 
classes of anxiolytic have no common clinical side effects and not only affect clinical 
anxiety but also affect hippocampal theta rhythm (McNaughton et al., 2007). Critically, 
anxiolytic benzodiazepines and 5HT1A acting drugs, such as buspirone, affect the BIS 
but not FFFS.  So, to assess BIS involvement in any neural or behavioural system we 
just need to show a common effect of the two classes of anxiolytic. 
The key point is that a state measure of conflict, including theta, should only be 
accepted if it shows a decrease (ideally, for theta, in both frequency and amplitude) with 
both benzodiazepine and serotonergic anxiolytic drugs. This is in contrast to studies of 
frontal midline theta, which have shown increases with both classes of drug ( for review, 
see section 6.3.1 in Mitchell et al., 2008). Indeed, conflict-related theta that appears at 
right frontal sites in the stop signal task (Neo et al., 2011) has been shown to be 
decreased by both classes of drug when other theta, in the same task, was increased 
(McNaughton et al, submitted). 
 There are a variety of reasons for seeing drugs as final crucial touchstones for 
tests of the state aspects of the theory and, potentially, genetics as the touchstone for 
traits. However, we emphasise behavioural and EEG (or imaging) methods above 
because, while drugs can validate a test, they operate on states and cannot assess the 
longer-term, personality-linked variation in the character that can then be assessed by the 
test they have validated. By contrast, imaging and EEG can provide amplitude values for 
a particular state response and these can be compared across people and so correlated 
with their scores on personality scales. We, thus, have to find tests (like those 
exemplified in section 2 above) with strong theoretical underpinnings to assess (in the 
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absence of drugs) personality variation (which, only once determined can we link to 
genetics).  
 In this discussion, we have focussed on conflict and non-panicolytic anxiolytic 
drugs. However, detailed neural theory also suggests that dopamine should be involved 
more in, and define sensitivity to, the BAS; serotonin (coupled with noradrenaline), both 
the FFFS and BIS. Likewise, paralleling the mutual opposition between the BAS and 
FFFS, it has been suggested there is mutual opposition between the dopamine and 
serotonin systems (Boureau and Dayan, 2010). However, we have already noted that the 
monoamines all have actions that span the systems we have delineated and so are 
unlikely to embody any one of the 5 specific RST sensitivities we have proposed.  
 
5 CONCLUSION  
5.1 Summary of main points 
1. The concepts of ‘reward sensitivity’ and ‘punishment sensitivity’ at the core of a 
broad family of reinforcement-based personality theories need to be replaced.  In 
the case of ‘punishment’, we have identified at least three neurally-distinct 
meanings of the term. 
2. The most novel proposal of this work is that personality theory must take into 
account the valuation of positive (gain) and negative (loss) events and treat these 
as orthogonal to the motivation to approach or avoid. On this view ‘loss 
aversion’, as studied in economics, represents a systematic population difference 
between personality factors of gain and loss sensitivity. 
3. Valuation must, then, be combined with a contingency of presentation or 
omission to generate an attractor or repulsor. Attractors and repulsors then 
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operate via distinct sensitivities (unrelated to the sensitivities of the two valuation 
systems) to activate the BAS and FFFS, respectively. 
4. There are three (not two) fundamental systems controlling the output of 
motivated behaviour (whether innate or learned): attraction/approach (BAS), 
repulsion/avoidance (FFFS), and conflict resolution (BIS; this is responsible for 
inhibition of pre-potent behaviour and activation of threat assessment when there 
is a similar and concurrent activation of the BAS and FFFS that is producing 
emotional goal conflict). 
5. We speculate that there may be five primary personality sensitivities related to 
reinforcers: positive evaluation, negative evaluation, attraction, repulsion and 
conflict. However, further empirical work is needed to determine if these 
separate processes are represented at the level of personality. 
6. At present, there would appear to be general superordinate traits of 
‘neuroticism/emotionality’ (linked to noradrenalin and serotonin) related to both 
the FFFS and BIS; and ‘extraversion’ (linked to dopamine) related to the BAS 
and some other aspects of positive affect. There also appear to exist smaller scale 
traits (e.g. obsessionality and panic proneness). We argue that a range of 
psychopathologies reflect the extreme ends of a normal distribution of one or 
more of these various (superordinate, RST, subordinate) factors. 
7. We do not assume that the fundamental biological entities controlling these traits 
are necessarily completely independent. However, even if the fundamental trait 
variables are orthogonal, our analysis of the state systems indicates that there will 
likely be interaction between them both concurrently (as with the subtraction of 
approach tendencies from avoidance tendencies) and sequentially (as with the 
capacity for neuroticism to act as a risk factor for trait anxiety and trait fear). 
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Assessing systems that, ex hypothesi, will interact to generate any specific 
behaviour creates special problems for experimental design. Examples of some 
initial empirical demonstrations of system separation and specific measurement 
were provided. 
8. These proposals require experimentation to test their validity; and we suggest 
that such testing would be best attempted via a combination of behavioural 
analysis, neuroscientific assays and both intra- and inter-individual personality 
study. 
 
5.2 Final words 
 
 We have presented a review of issues that, we believe, are important for 
approach-avoidance theories in general and Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) in 
particular. We follow Smillie et al (2006b) in believing that revised state RST holds 
important implications for how the personality traits associated with its systems should 
be measured. Our clarification and elaboration of state RST highlights the problems that 
must be addressed in translating to a trait RST model, which we hope is a step towards 
resolving these problems and, ultimately, integrating the entire family of approach-
avoidance personality theories. Specifically, we have called attention to three major 
issues: (1) the relevance of findings from behavioural economics, relating to gain 
evaluation and loss aversion; (2) the conflation of perception-valuation and motivation-
action and thus confusion surrounding the use of the terms ‘reward’ and, even more so, 
‘punishment’; and, (3) the common role played by innate and conditioned reinforcers, 
and so the inappropriate status of the term reinforcement in the family of personality 
theories that have approach and avoidance systems at their core.  
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 This article concludes with the suggestion that in the form in which we have 
now cast it, the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) would be better termed the 
Reinforcer Sensitivity Theory of personality, representing all five systems we have 
identified, as contrasted with the revised three systems (i.e. FFFS, BIS, BAS; Gray and 
McNaughton, 2000) and the classic two systems (BIS/BAS; Gray, 1982) previous 
versions. For the sake of clarity, we suggest that in future writings these are respectively 
differentiated as: RST-5, RST-3, RST-2.  
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1. The relationship of external items to their internal value, which controls the strength 
(but not direction) of their effect on behaviour. Individual items (consumable food, dollar gains, 
etc) have a value that depends on their amount and the current level of specific drive for that 
class of item. The amount, therefore, interacts with an individual exchange rate (first grey 
rectangle, represented by varying arrow thicknesses) to generate an internal valuation, which 
can be positive or negative depending on the valence of the item (e.g. dollar gain versus dollar 
loss in the form of explicit removal from an existing store). For the same amount of the same 
class of item, such as dollars (which necessarily matches individual item exchange rate), 
negative valence has a higher exchange rate (note thicker arrow) and so generates a greater 
internal value than positive (second grey rectangle, e.g. loss aversion). Loss aversion is a 
relative term (comparing the effect of loss with that of the same external value of gain) and we 
take it to represent the difference between trait gain sensitivity and trait loss sensitivity, with the 
latter being the greater.   
 
Figure 2. The combination of valuation and operant factors that determines response strength 
and direction. Items with a specific external value ($1) that can be gained or lost are represented 
by a particular internal amount that will depend on the exchange rate (or the level of “hunger”) for 
the item (see Figure 1). In this example all inputs are $1 and so exchange rate is ignored. The 
internal value that drives decisions and the intensity of action also depends on whether the item 
is gained or lost. Economic analysis has shown that the same external value generally has a 
greater effect if it is a loss (Loss exchange rate) than if it is a gain (Gain exchange rate). The 
effect of this internal valuation on behaviour then depends on the consequences of responding. 
Gain production and loss prevention activate approach; loss production and gain prevention 
activate avoidance. Concurrent APPROACH and AVOID tendencies are then integrated to 
determine the direction and strength of responding. A fixed internal value of approach and 
avoidance will have different effects on response strength (Attractor exchange rate;  
Repulsor exchange rate) that depends both on factors of reinforcement sensitivity and on the 
distance from the goal that will be achieved by responding. (Approach and avoidance have 
different goal gradients, see Section 2.8.) 
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Figure 3. A. Observed speeds resulting from the combination of a specific dollar value (gain 
averaged with omission of loss – separate values plotted as separate curves) for the production 
of a response with a specific dollar value (loss averaged with the omission of gain – repulsor 
value, X axis) for the inhibition of the response. The probability for gain or loss on any particular 
trial was equal. Open circles indicate the point on each curve at which the net value averages to 
$1. B. The same data represented as point values with the curves resulting from the optimised 
fitted functions based on previous animal behaviour analysis (see text). 
 
Figure 4. Observed differences in speed between gain and loss manipulations for the 
combination of a specific attraction value for the response with a particular repulsion value. 
Attraction dollar value is gain averaged with omission of loss (separate values plotted as 
separate curves). Repulsion dollar value is loss averaged with the omission of gain and is plotted 
on the X axis. The probability of gain or loss on any particular trial was equal. Open circles 
indicate the point on each curve at which the attraction and repulsion values are equal. 
 
Figure 5. Overall relation of the BIS, FFFS and BAS – an updated model. To activate the BIS 
one must generate concurrent and approximately equal activation of the FFFS and the BAS, i.e. 
face the animal with an approach-avoidance conflict. Both simple approach and simple 
avoidance will then be inhibited and replaced with environmental scanning (in the form of altered 
attention), external scanning (risk assessment behaviour) and internal scanning of memory. Note 
that all of these scanning operations are aimed at detecting affectively negative information and 
involve a selective increase (stippled arrow) in the salience and value of aversive information. As 
a result, a secondary consequence of activation of the system is normally a shift of the balance 
between approach and avoidance tendencies in the direction of avoidance. However, when 
scanning determines that danger is absent the approach-avoidance conflict is resolved in favour 
of approach. The inputs to the system are classified in terms of the delivery (+) or omission (-) of 
primary positive reinforcers (PosR) or primary negative reinforcers (NegR) or conditional stimuli 
(CS) or innate stimuli (IS) that predict such primary events. (Adapted from Gray and 
McNaughton, 2000.) As discussed earlier we see loss (i.e. removal of a positive reinforcer from 
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an existing store) as a form of NegR, thus allowing for both Loss+ and Loss- (see section 2.6, 
2.7). Specific cases of PosR and NegR will have their own individual exchange rates but, as 
discussed in the text, their effect will also be modulated by a general sensitivity factor that is 
different for the two classes of reinforcer. The stippled areas in the model are all points at which 
general personality factors could operate (see section 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
